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Abstract
We analyze a Hotelling location-then-price duopoly game under demand un-
certainty with uniformly distributed consumers in a standard quadratic costs sce-
nario. The novelty of our approach consists of assuming that rms' beliefs are
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rms' subgame-perfect product design decisions under ambiguity. Furthermore, we
investigate the inuence of ambiguity and ambiguity attitude on equilibrium product
di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1 Introduction
Product development is one of the most inuential processes for the success of an enter-
prise, see for instance Brown and Eisenhardt (1995). Firms compete by creating products
with new or dierent characteristics, amongst others, in order to enter new markets, to
retain current customers or to attract new purchasers.
A well-known and widely studied model of product dierentiation is the location-then-
price duopoly game by Hotelling (1929).1 In his original framework, Hotelling discussed
a model with two rms and uniformly distributed consumers along a compact interval
facing linear transportation costs. At the rst stage of the game, rms choose simultane-
ously their locations on this interval. At the second stage, rms face price competition.
Hotelling's result can be summarized in the so-called "Principle of Minimum Dieren-
tiation", implying that both rms' unique subgame-perfect locations are given by the
midpoint of the support of consumer interval.
A vast literature deals with a multitude of extensions of Hotelling's model.2 In partic-
ular, D'Aspremont et al. (1979) show that, under linear cost functions, the existence of
a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (henceforth SPNE ) is not guaranteed. As a resort
to this complication, D'Aspremont et al. (1979) replaced Hotelling's original assumption
of linear costs by quadratic costs. In the literature, Hotelling models with quadratic
cost functions are frequently denoted by "AGT-models"3. Under this assumption, the
existence of a unique SPNE is ensured for all parameter constellations. Contrary to
Hotelling's original ndings, rms' equilibrium product characteristics under quadratic
costs are located at the boundaries of the support of the consumer interval. This nding
can be subsumed under the so-called "Maximum Dierentiation Principle". Hotelling
models with diverse types of costs functions are discussed in Anderson (1988).
Another strand of literature focuses on relaxing the assumption of uniform consumer den-
sities thereby questioning the robustness of the principle of minimum or maximum dif-
1The "location" in Hotelling's game is typically interpreted as a position in a geographical or product
type space. In this paper, we focus in the following on the latter interpretation.
2See e.g. Gabszewicz and Thisse (1992) for a survey.
3AGT stands for D'Aspremont, Gabszewicz and Thisse
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ferentiation. For instance, Anderson et al. (1997) consider general log-concave consumer
densities. Neven (1986) nds that rms deviate from the "Maximum Dierentiation Prin-
ciple", by selecting product characteristics which are closer to the center of mass of the
respective consumer taste distribution.
Since in most real-world situations, rms are confronted with uncertain consumer pref-
erences, a part of the more recent literature analyzes the impact of demand uncertainty
on equilibrium product dierentiation. Balvers and Szerb (1996) consider a Hotelling
framework incorporating random shocks on the quality of each rm's product, under the
assumption that there is no price competition. Harter (1996) considers a Hotelling model
with demand location uncertainty, where rms enter the market sequentially. Similar
to Harter (1996), Casado-Izaga (2000)4, Meagher and Zauner (2004) and Meagher and
Zauner (2005) discuss extensions of Hotelling's model, where demand uncertainty is intro-
duced by enabling the midpoint of the consumer interval to be probabilistic. Meagher and
Zauner (2005) generalize Casado-Izaga (2000) by parametrizing the length of the support.
They nd that equilibrium dierentiation increases in the size of the support. Meagher
and Zauner (2004) restrict the support of midpoint of the consumer distribution to com-
pact subsets of the interval
 1
2
; 1
2

, but allow for a broad class of density functions.
Again, Meagher and Zauner (henceforth MZ) come to the conclusion that uncertainty
constitutes a dierentiation force, namely an increase in the variance of the underlying
probability distribution over the midpoint leads to more pronounced equilibrium product
dierentiation.
All the contributions above imply that rms' beliefs are represented by a unique common
prior. However, in reality, this assumption may be violated for several reasons. First of
all, the assumption of a unique common probability distribution for both rms is more
restrictive than it may seem to be at rst glance, especially in situations, where both rms
are ex-ante completely uninformed or incapable to rely on past experiences or observable
data. Furthermore, critiques in favor of a unique common probability distribution may
4Casado-Izaga (2000) assume that consumers are uniformly distributed over the interval [; + 1]
where  is drawn from a uniform distribution [0; 1]. Consequently, the midpoint of the consumer interval
follows implicitly a uniform distribution on [ 12 ;
3
2 ].
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argue, that it is possible to apply the "principle of insucient reason"5 in case of missing
information. However, Ellsberg (1961) indicate in his famous mind experiment that there
are situations under ambiguity where a considerable share of individuals display prefer-
ences which are incompatible with probabilistic beliefs. Ellsberg's hypothesis is meanwhile
conrmed by experimental evidence (Camerer and Weber, 1992). Ambiguity or Knightian
Uncertainty refers to situations where probabilities are unknown or imperfectly known.
Already Knight (1921), made the distinction between incalculable and calculable risk.
Nevertheless, ambiguity is not captured by the classical theories of decision under uncer-
tainty. Expected utility theory which is axiomatized in Von Neumann and Morgenstern
(1944) refers to situations with known (objective) probabilities. In subjective expected
utility (henceforth SEU ) theory by Savage (1954), decision-makers' exhibit preferences
which are compatible with a subjective probability measure.
By now several decision theoretic models of ambiguity have been developed. Prominent
examples are the multiple prior model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), the Choquet
expected utility (henceforth CEU ) model of Schmeidler (1989) and the smooth ambiguity
model of Klibano et al. (2005).
Although ambiguity is prevalent in many real-world situations, there are almost no
Hotelling models incorporating this type of uncertainty. To our knowledge, a recent paper
by Krol (2012) is the sole contribution on this topic. Krol (2012) introduces complete
ambiguity6 into the framework of Meagher and Zauner (2004) and examines, amongst oth-
ers, the inuence of ambiguity attitude on rms' decisions if rms use the Arrow/Hurwicz
-maxmin criterion7. Krol (2012) nds that ambiguity can be an agglomeration force if
rms are suciently pessimistic.
The present paper studies the impact of the degree of ambiguity and ambiguity at-
titude on product dierentiation. Inspired by the contributions of MZ and Krol (2012),
5The "principle of insucient reason" or "principle of indierence", amongst others, enunciated in the
works of Pierre-Simon Laplace (see e.g. Laplace (1812)) states roughly that if we have no information
about the occurrence of events and therefore no reason to believe that an event will occur preferentially
compared to another, we may consider the events as equally likely.
6Complete ambiguity or ignorance refers to a situation where no probabilistic information at all is
available.
7See Hurwicz (1951) and Arrow and Hurwicz (1972).
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we develop a Hotelling model with demand location uncertainty by using the frame-
work of Meagher and Zauner (2004) and Schmeidler's concept of CEU. More specically,
we assume that rms' beliefs are represented by neo-additive capacity introduced by
Chateauneuf et al. (2007). Our framework provides additional analytical tools for un-
derstanding product dierentiation under demand uncertainty. Besides rms' ambiguity
attitude, we distinguish four sources of ambiguity and determine their inuence on rms'
decisions: (i) the variance of rms' prior beliefs, (ii) the degree of ambiguity, (iii) the size
of the support of the uncertainty and (iv) the magnitude of the parameter of consumers'
quadratic cost functions. In particular, (ii) oers plausible possible explanations for real-
life phenomena. In fact, the models of Meagher and Zauner (2004)8 and Krol (2012) are
special cases of our model. Hence, our model can be considered as a generalization of
both models.
Our paper is organized as follows: In the following section, we describe in detail our
model. Afterwards, we derive rms' (pure strategy) subgame-perfect product character-
istic choices for the Hotelling game under ambiguity. Thereby, we assume that rms'
beliefs are represented by neo-additive capacities. In section 4 of our paper, we carry
out a comparative static analysis with respect to all model parameters and study impli-
cations for equilibrium product characteristics and Choquet expected prots. Section 5
deals with implications for possible applications of the Hotelling model under demand
location uncertainty. In particular, we will reexamine the examples mentioned in Krol
(2012). Finally, section 6 concludes with a summary and a discussion of our ndings.
8With a technical restriction. For more details see section 3, especially Remarks 3.1 and 3.3.
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2 The Model
2.1 Basic Framework
The framework is based on the modied AGT-model of Meagher and Zauner (2004).
There are two rms, i = 1; 2, interacting in a two-stage Hotelling duopoly. Each rm
produces a homogeneous commodity at constant marginal production costs which are
normalized to zero. At the rst stage of the game, rms simultaneously select their prod-
uct characteristics from the real line, xi 2 R, where it is assumed w.l.o.g. (without loss of
generality) that x1  x2. At the second stage of the game, rms face price competition,
setting prices, pi 2 R+, simultaneously.
Furthermore, there is a unit mass of consumers, each consumer being uniquely character-
ized by a specic taste, s 2 R, representing his/her ideal commodity. Consumer tastes
are assumed to be uniformly distributed on an interval of the form [M   1
2
;M + 1
2
] where
M 2 R. Note that in contrast to Hotelling (1929), the support of the consumer taste
distribution is a strict subset of the product type space.9 A customer whose taste is
located at s and who consumes product i faces a disutility from not consuming his/her
ideal product. The utility loss of the consumer depends on the squared distance between
s and the product characteristic xi, formally t(s xi)2, where t 2 R++.10 In addition, the
consumer has to pay the price of product i, pi. Consequently, the consumer's total costs
are pi + t(s   xi)2. Moreover, we assume that every customer purchases one unit of the
homogeneous good from the rm where total costs are lower.
In the certainty model, M and t are a xed and exogenously given parameters known
to both rms throughout the game. In the risk model of Meagher and Zauner (2004),
M is unknown to both rms, whereas the scaling parameter t is normalized to 1. In the
model of Krol (2012) rms face ambiguity with respect to (t;M), resolving ambiguity
with the Arrow/Hurwicz -maxmin criterion. Similar to these models, we presume that
9For the purpose of comparability, rms shall face the same choice sets under certainty and uncertainty.
Therefore, as in the paper by Anderson et al. (1997), rms may choose product characteristics from the
real line.
10The parameter t allows for an up- or downward distortion of this quadratic disutility.
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the realization of (t;M) denoted by (t^; M^) is revealed to both rms before the price
competition.
Assumption 1. Uncertainty is resolved at the second stage of the game. Hence, the
realization (t^; M^) is revealed to both rms after the product design competition, but before
the price game.
Remark 2.1. Assumption 1 is based on the fact that rms can normally change prices
easier than the characteristics of a product (Meagher and Zauner, 2004). For instance,
if actual sales volumes dier from estimated sales volumes, a rm can usually adjust the
price of the product.
Next, we assume that rms are not necessarily completely uninformed. There can be
some probabilistic information which is represented by a common prior q on (t;M). We
will refer to q as "reference probability distribution" or "reference prior". Similar to the
risk case, we have to make several assumptions concerning the reference probability q.
Assumption 2. The reference prior q on (t;M) satises the subsequent requirements:
(R1) Expectation and variance of M exist: Eq[M ] <1 and EqjM2j <1.
(R2) The expectation of M is normalized to zero: Eq[M ] = 0.
(R3) The distribution of M has no atoms.
(R4) The support of M is the symmetric interval [ L;L]   1
2
; 1
2

.
(R5) The support of t is the interval [t; 1] where t 2 (0; 1].
(R6) The expectation of t is normalized to 1: Eq[t] = 1.
(R7) The random variables t and M are uncorrelated.
where we have slightly abused notation denoting by Eq an expectation w.r.t. (with respect
to) the prior q.
The random variable M enters quadratically into each rm's objective function for the
rst stage of the game (see equation (3.3) and Lemma 3.4). Therefore, rms' product
characteristic choices are going to depend solely on the rst and second moment of the
distribution ofM . Consequently, (R1) guarantees the existence of best response functions.
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Moreover, taking (R1) and (R4) together, we can formulate the following lemma which is
a very useful tool for the mathematical proofs of the comparative statics section.
Lemma 2.1. The requirements (R1) and (R4) imply
Eq[M ] 2 [ L;L] and V arq(M) 2

0; L2

Proof. The proof of the lemma is contained in the appendix.
The requirements (R2) and (R6) are due to reasons of symmetry and tractability. Re-
quirement (R3) is purely technical in nature and could be replaced in order to allow for
discrete or mixtures with discrete distributions. (R4) makes sure that the support of M
is a compact subset of the interval [ 1
2
; 1
2
], restricting the size of uncertainty to be rela-
tively small. In addition, it assures that the extreme intervals for possible realizations of
the consumer distribution [ L  1
2
; L+ 1
2
] and [L  1
2
; L+ 1
2
] always have a non-empty
intersection, and therefore overlap. Furthermore, (R4) and (R5) imply that the support
of q is a subset of [t; 1] [ L;L]. Lastly, (R7) ensures that we can disentangle the random
variables t and M .
2.2 Introducing Ambiguity into the Game
In the following, we quickly discuss the three prominent decision theoretic models of
ambiguity mentioned in the introduction, and illustrate why we make use of the CEU
approach.
The multiple prior model (MP) was pioneered by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). The
key idea of this approach is that, in choice situations featuring ambiguity, individuals
dispose of insucient information to form a unique prior. Instead of that, individual
beliefs are captured by a set coexisting priors. Multiple prior decision rules are related
to non-probabilistic classical decision rules in economics. Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)
axiomatize minimum expected utility (henceforth MEU ) which corresponds to the deci-
sion rule by Wald (1950) (maxmin criterion). A decision-maker with MEU preferences
maximizes the expected value of and underlying objective function with respect to the
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worst-case scenario, i.e. the prior which yields the lowest expected value. In contrast to
that, a decision-maker utilizing the optimistic maxmax criterion, bases his expected value
on the best-case scenario. A generalization of the maxmin functional which takes both
criteria into account is the -MEU model. This model is related to the Arrow/Hurwicz
-maxmin criterion mentioned in the introduction.11 A decision-maker exhibiting -MEU
preferences maximizes a convex combination of the lowest and the highest expected value
regarding an underlying objective. The parameter of the convex combination, , can
be interpreted as the ambiguity attitude of the decision-maker. Ghirardato et al. (2004)
(henceforth GMM ) provide an axiomatization of -MEU preferences. However, Eich-
berger et al. (2011) show that in case of nite state spaces any -MEU preferences which
satisfy GMM's axioms must be either maxmin or maxmax.
The second approach we want to mention is the smooth ambiguity model by Klibano
et al. (2005). In this setting, uncertainty of an individual with respect to rst-order prob-
abilities is captured by a (subjective) second-order probability distribution. Ambiguity
attitude is modeled by limiting the reduction of compound lotteries with regard to rst
and second order probabilities.
The third prominent approach known as CEU theory was introduced and axiomatized by
Schmeidler (1989). In this model, decision-makers' beliefs are represented by nonadditive
probabilities (or capacities). A capacity is a normalized and monotonic set function.
Denition 2.1 (compare Schmeidler (1989)). Let 
 be a nite or innite non-empty set
of states of the world and let  be an algebra of events dened on it. A capacity is a
real-valued function  : ! R such that
(1) (?) = 0 and (
) = 1 (normalization)
(2) E;F 2  and E  F implies (E)  (F ) (monotonicity).
Hence, a capacity can be seen as a generalization of a probability measure which not
necessarily satises the property of -additivity. The expectation w.r.t. a nonadditive
measure is formed by using a Choquet integral (see Choquet (1955)). The CEU theory
11Krol (2012) uses basically the multiple prior approach by assuming that rms' common prior set is
the set of all possible probability distributions on a given state space.
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has a solid axiomatic foundation. Moreover, it is more general than the multiple prior
approach due to the wide spectrum of possible capacities. However, for a certain class of
capacities, CEU is equivalent to MEU and -MEU respectively (see e.g. Chateauneuf et al.
(2007)). In this case, both approaches yield the same decision rule. In the present paper,
ambiguity is modelled with neo-additive capacities which are axiomatized in Chateauneuf
et al. (2007).
Assumption 3. Each rm's belief is represented by a neo-additive capacity as dened in
Denition 2.2.
The neo-additive capacity represents rms' ex-ante uncertainty of (t;M). We refer to the
denition of a neo-additive capacity from Eichberger et al. (2009), page 359:
Denition 2.2. Let q be a probability distribution on 
 = [t; 1]  [ L;L] satisfying
Assumption 2. Then, for real numbers  and  dene a neo-additive capacity  by (?) =
0, (
) = 1, (A) = +(1  )q(A), where A 2  is a nonempty and strict subset of 
.
Remark 2.2. From our point of view, neo-additive capacities display several nice features.
The parameter  can be interpreted as a measure of ambiguity or of rms' condence in
the common reference prior q. Hence, one can interpret our model as a setting where
rms exhibit uncertainty with respect to their prior beliefs due to imprecise or doubtful
information.
Moreover, the parameter  describes rms' attitude towards ambiguity. The higher ,
the more pessimistic rm managers are. Consequently, neo-additive capacities allow for a
clear separation between the degree of ambiguity and rms' ambiguity attitude which is,
as we want to argue in this paper, essential for many economic applications. Furthermore,
it is worthwhile to mention some special cases of neo-additive capacities which are relevant
in this paper. For  = 0, one obtains SEU of Savage (1954). For  = 1 and  2 [0; 1] one
obtains -MEU including the special case MEU for  = 1.
The rationale speaking for the introduction of neo-additive capacities lies in in the fact
that rms might not completely trust the information available to them at the time of
making their product choice. There are multiple reasons why this might be the case, e.g.
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rms introducing newly innovated products into the market could have data on similar
products that are already established in the market but have no data on the new good. It
seems plausible that rms use this data to predict the market outcome, still rms cannot
account for short-term trends in consumer tastes. Furthermore, data reliability is closely
tied to the comparability of the reference product with the newly innovated product. The
more heterogeneous both products are, the less plausible it seems to rely on available
data of the reference product. In contrast to an -MEU approach, neo-additive capacities
allow for a model of partial information, where rms have a certain stock of data available
whose reliability might be questionable up to a certain degree. Interpreted in this way,
the -MEU approach refers to a situation where rms have ex-ante no information about
the distribution of consumer tastes or completely distrust information available at the
time of making their product design choices. Moreover, neo-additive capacities allow for
an additional interpretative component for a multitude of possible applications of the
Hotelling model by adding an additional explanatory source for increasing or decreasing
product dierentiation under ambiguity.
3 Solving the Game
In this section, we determine equilibrium product dierentiation under ambiguity by
backward induction. Consequently, in a rst step, we solve the price subgame at the
second stage where the midpoint M of the consumer distribution and the cost parameter
t are x and known to both rms. By using equilibrium prices, we afterwards identify
rms' optimal product design decisions at the rst stage of the game.
3.1 The Price Subgame
According to Assumption 1, uncertainty is resolved at the second stage of the game, i.e.
the realization (t^; M^) is known to both rms.
If rms do not dierentiate their products, x1 = x2, they face standard Bertrand compe-
tition. At the Bertrand equilibrium, each rm charges a price of zero.
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Otherwise, if x1 < x2, rms' price reaction functions depend parametrically on the dis-
tance of the midpoint of rms' product characteristics, x := x1+x2
2
, to the midpoint of the
support of the consumer taste distribution, M^ . If the distance is sucient small, there
exists a consumer who is indierent between buying from rm 1 or rm 2, p1+ t^(x1 )2 =
p2+ t^(x2 )2. Hence, the taste of the indierent consumer,  2 [M^  12 ; M^+ 12 ], is uniquely
determined by
(x1; x2; p1; p2) = x+
p2   p1
2t^x
(3.1)
where x = x2   x1 > 0 denotes rms' product dierentiation.
All consumers whose tastes are located to the left of  purchase product 1. Therefore,
the aggregate demand for the products are D1() =    M^ + 12 and D2() = 1  D1().
Hence, one of the rms covers the whole market if the indierent consumer is located at
one of the boundaries of the support of the consumer taste distribution, [M^   1
2
; M^ + 1
2
].
Since production costs are normalized to zero, rm i's prot function is
i(pi; ) = piDi() (3.2)
Solving the rst-order condition of equation (3.2) yields the following price equilibrium.
Lemma 3.1 (Interior price equilibrium). If x1 < x2 and (M^   x) 2 [ 32 ; 32 ], then rms
charge the subsequent equilibrium prices
p1 =
2
3
t^x

x  M^ + 3
2

and p2 =
2
3
t^x

 x+ M^ + 3
2

Proof. The proof of the lemma is contained in the appendix. Compare also Anderson
et al. (1997), page 107 and Meagher and Zauner (2004), page 203.
At the interior price equilibrium, the taste of the indierent consumer is located at  :=
(x1; x2; p

1; p

2) =
2M^+x
3
. However, the indierent consumer exists only if his/her taste is
contained in the consumer interval, i.e. if (M^   x) 2 [ 3
2
; 3
2
]. Otherwise, the product
characteristic of one rm is so far away from consumer tastes that the other rm can
guarantee to obtain the whole market demand (Anderson et al., 1997). We need to
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consider two cases: If we have (M^   x) <  3
2
, rm 1's product characteristic is closer to
any consumer taste in [M^  1
2
; M^+ 1
2
] than the product characteristic of rm 2. Therefore,
rm 1 will charge a price subject to (3.1) such that it can get the whole consumer demand.
If so, rm 2 will get a prot of zero, no matter what price it may charge. Similarly, for
(M^  x) > 3
2
, rm 2 will charge a price subject to (3.1), such that the demand for product
1 is zero, no matter what price rm 1 may charge. In total, we obtain two boundary price
equilibria given by Lemma (3.2) below. In each of these equilibria one of the two rms
becomes a monopolist.
Lemma 3.2 (Boundary price equilibria). If x1 < x2 and (M^   x) =2 [ 32 ; 32 ], then rms
charge the subsequent equilibrium prices
p1 = 2t^x

x  M^   1
2

and p2 = 0 if (M^   x) <  
3
2
and
p2 = 2t^x

M^   x  1
2

and p1 = 0 if (M^   x) >
3
2
:
Proof. The proof of the lemma is contained in the appendix. Compare also Anderson
et al. (1997), page 107 and Meagher and Zauner (2004), page 203.
3.2 Product Design Competition
As shown in the previous section, the equilibrium for the price subgame is unique for a
xed pair of product characteristics, (x1; x2). By using equilibrium prices from Lemma 3.1
and 3.2, we obtain rms' second stage prots, i(xi; xj; t^; M^) := i(p

i ; (xi; xj; p

i ; p

j))
12,
at the realization (t^; M^) depending on rms' product characteristics:
i(xi; xj; t^; M^) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
t^x
h
1 + 2 ( 1)i(M^   x)
i
for ( 1)i (M^   x) > 3
2
t^x
h
3( 1)i + 2(M^   x)
i2
=18 for (M^   x) 2 [ 3
2
; 3
2
]
0 otherwise
(3.3)
12Note that the prot functions are well-behaved in the sense that they are compatible with the case
that rms do not dierentiate: lim
xi!xj
i(xi; xj ; t^; M^) = 0.
12
where x := x1+x2
2
and x := x2   x1 as before.
In the following, we want to elaborate on each rm's objective function at the rst stage
of the game. In order to do so, we make use of the fact that the second piece of (3.3) is
monotonic in (t^; M^) as specied in Lemma 3.3 below.
Lemma 3.3. If (M^   x) 2 [ 3
2
; 3
2
], then rm i's prot function i(x1; x2; t^; M^) is strictly
increasing in t^, strictly decreasing in M^ for i = 1 and strictly increasing for i = 2 provided
that x1 < x2.
Proof. The proof of the lemma is contained in the appendix.
Now, turning to the rst stage of the game, according to the assumptions 1 and 2, the
actual realization (t^; M^) of the random variable (t;M) is unknown. Furthermore, rms
might not have sucient probabilistic information. Therefore, ex-ante, rms consider the
Choquet expected value of (3.3), CEU[i(xi; xj; t^; M^)], w.r.t. a neo-additive capacity in
accordance with Assumption 3 and Denition 2.2. Following Lemma 3.1 in Chateauneuf
et al. (2007), page 541, we obtain the following representation of rm i's Choquet expected
prot at the rst stage of the game:
CEU[i(x1; x2; t;M)] =
Z
i(xi; xj; t^; M^)d = (1  )Eq[i(xi; xj; t;M)]
+ [(1  )maxfi(xi; xj; t^; M^) : (t^; M^) 2 supp(t;M)g
+ minfi(xi; xj; t^; M^) : (t^; M^) 2 supp(t;M)g]
(3.4)
Remark 3.1. These Choquet expected prots allow for a nice interpretation, namely
that they generalize Hotelling models which have been treated in the literature before.
For  = 0 and a constant scaling factor t = 1, we obtain the model of Meagher and Zauner
(2004) with a normalized mean of M . For  = 1, we obtain the -MEU model of Krol
(2012). Thus, we can consider these cases as extreme cases of the capacity model. For
0 <  < 1, we obtain a convex combination of the risk case and the -MEU model.
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As a next step, we consider the -MEU part of equation (3.4). Making use of Lemma
3.3, we obtain for (M^   x) 2 [ 3
2
; 3
2
] the following explicit functional relationships
maxf1(xi; xj; t^; M^) : (t^; M^) 2 supp(t;M)g = 1(x1; x2; 1; L)
minf1(xi; xj; t^; M^) : (t^; M^) 2 supp(t;M)g] = 1(x1; x2; t; L)
maxf2(xi; xj; t^; M^) : (t^; M^) 2 supp(t;M)g = 2(x1; x2; 1; L)
minf2(xi; xj; t^; M^) : (t^; M^) 2 supp(t;M)g] = 2(x1; x2; t; L)
(3.5)
Remark 3.2. One can interpret this result as follows. Firm 1's best-case scenario is when
the midpoint of the consumer interval takes as realization the lower support boundary  L.
This is true, since we assumed w.l.o.g. that rm 1 is the rm whose product characteristic
is left of rm 2's product characteristic. Therefore, it is more convenient for rm 1 if the
consumer distribution is located closer to its own product characteristic. Similarly, rm
1's worst-case scenario is when the midpoint of the consumer interval takes as realization
the upper support boundary L. For rm 2 the reverse result holds: Realizations of M
which are more to the left are detrimental and realizations to the right are benecial.
The best possible case is if M^ = L and the worst possible case materializes if M^ =  L.
Concerning the cost parameter, best- and worst-cases are the same for both rms. The
best-case arises for a high cost parameter t = 1, the worst-case arises for t = t.
The rst term of rm i's Choquet expected prot equals the (usual) expectation of its
prot function with respect to the reference prior, Eq[i(x1; x1; t;M)]. In order to elabo-
rate on this part, we need the following Lemma, which can be considered as an analogue
to the global competition lemma in Meagher and Zauner (2004).13
Lemma 3.4 (Global competition). Under assumptions 1,2 and 3, at any pure strategy
SPNE for the Hotelling game with ambiguous demand location uncertainty, the support
[ L;L] ofM is contained in [x  3
2
; x+ 3
2
], formally [ L;L]  x  3
2
; x+ 3
2

: An equivalent
13For the Hotelling model under certainty, Anderson et al. (1997) point out a similar property in
footnote 8.
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and more intuitive formulation of this nding is given by
L  3
2
< x <  L+ 3
2
(3.6)
Proof. The proof of the lemma is contained in the appendix.
Lemma 3.4 proves very useful when it comes to determining rms' subgame-perfect prod-
uct characteristic choices. In fact, due to Lemma 3.2, one could expect, that there are
equilibria where for some realizations of uncertainty, one or the other rm can monopolize
the market. However, according to the global competition lemma, rm i's objective func-
tion at the rst stage of the game is given by the Choquet expected value of the second
piece of (3.3).
Furthermore, the global competition lemma implies that Eq[i(xi; xj; t;M)] depends solely
on the entries of the mean vector Eq[(t;M)] = (t; M) as well as the entries of the
variance-covariance matrix
Covq(t;M) =
0B@ 2t 0
0 2M
1CA :
The following lemma gives Eq[i(xi; xj; t;M)] in an explicit mathematical form.
Lemma 3.5. If x1  x2 w.l.o.g., then, under assumptions 1,2 and 3, at any pure strategy
SPNE for the Hotelling game under uncertainty, rms choose product characteristics,
(x1; x

2), such that rm i's expected prot w.r.t. the reference prior q is
Eq[i(xi ; xj ; t;M)] = t
LZ
 L
( 1)j 2
9
(xj   xi )

x  

M +
3
2
( 1)i
2
f(M)dM
=
( 1)j
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t (x

j   xi )

(2x   3( 1)i)2
  4M(2x   3( 1)i) + 4(M + 2M)

(3.7)
where x = xi + x

j .
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Proof. The proof of the lemma is contained in the appendix.
Now, that we specied rms' objective functions for the rst stage of the game, we
can derive rms' subgame-perfect product characteristics. Firm 1's best reply, R1(x^2),
given the product characteristic choice of rm 2, x^2, is
R1(x^2) := argmax
x12R

(1  )Eq[1(x1; x^2; t;M)]+ 

(1 )1(x1; x^2; 1; L)+1(x1; x^2; t; L)

and rm 2's best reply, R2(x^1), given the product choice of rm 1, x^1, is
R2(x^1) := argmax
x22R

(1 )Eq[2(x^1; x2; t;M)]+

(1 )2(x^1; x2; 1; L)+2(x^1; x2; t; L)

:
Hence, the following system of equations describes rms' mutual best replies:
R1(x

2) = x

1 and R

2(x

1) = x

2 (3.8)
By solving (3.8), one obtain rms' subgame-perfect product characteristic choices as spec-
ied in Proposition 3.1.
Proposition 3.1 (Equilibrium dierentiation). Under Assumptions 1,2 and 3, there is
a unique pure strategy SPNE for the Hotelling game under ambiguity. The equilibrium
dierentiation, x := x

2   x1, is
x =
4  ( t+ (1  )) L2 + 12  ((1  )   t) L+ (4  4 ) 2 + 9 (  t    + 1)
4  ( t+ (  1)) L  6 (  t+     1)
and rms' Choquet expected equilibrium prots are
CEU[i ] =
 
4  L2 ( t  + 1)  12  L ( t  + 1) + 42 (1  ) + 9 (  t    + 1)2
36 (2  L (  t  + 1) + 3 (  t    + 1))
where i := i(x

1; x

2; t;M).
Proof. Firms' equilibrium product characteristics and the proof of the proposition is
contained in the appendix.
Remark 3.3. It is worthwhile to highlight and discuss some special cases of this equi-
librium. Setting  = 1, which corresponds to a situation under complete ambiguity (or
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without any condence into the reference prior q), one obtain the equilibrium of Krol
(2012) in its full generality. Setting  = 0, we obtain the equilibrium in Meagher and Za-
uner (2004) with the slight dierence, that we allow explicitly for a normalized probability
which may not necessarily be objectively given and is therefore subjective in nature. The
normalization Eq[M ] = 0 ensures symmetry and is, in our view, not a strong restriction.
We can interpret this assumption in the following way: Both rms determine the expected
midpoint of the consumer interval and align all possible product designs symmetrically
around this mean. If the mean is nonzero, rms can transform the set of all product
characteristics to be centered around zero. After determining their product characteristic
choices in the normalized setting, rms may retransform their product characteristic de-
cision into the non-normalized product space and obtain the optimal product design. For
consumer distributions with nonzero mean, there are no solutions in closed-form for rms'
subgame-perfect product characteristic choices. Nevertheless, it is plausible to argue, that
both rms will shift their subgame-perfect locations into the direction of this mean.
More special cases arise, when rms are purely pessimistic  = 1 or purely optimistic
 = 0. The following corollaries describes the pure strategy SPNE under global pessimism
and optimism respectively.
Corollary 3.1 (Equilibrium dierentiation with global pessimism). If rms are purely
pessimistic,  = 1, then the equilibrium dierentiation is
x =
4  L2 + 12  L+ (4  4 ) 2 + 9
4  L+ 6
and rms' Choquet expected equilibrium prots are
CEU[i ] =
(4  L2 + 12  L  4  2 + 42 + 9)2
36 (2  L+ 3)
Proof. Consider proposition 3.1 for  = 1. 
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Corollary 3.2 (Equilibrium dierentiation with global optimism). If rms are purely
optimistic,  = 0, then the equilibrium dierentiation is
x =  
4  t L2   12  t L+ 9  t+ (4  4 ) 2   9  + 9
4  t L  6  t+ 6    6
and rms' Choquet expected equilibrium prots are
CEU[i] =
(4  t L2   12  t L+ 9  t  4  2 + 4 2   9  + 9)2
36 ( 2  t L+ 3  t  3  + 3)
Proof. Consider proposition 3.1 for  = 0. 
4 Comparative Statics
The aforementioned Hotelling model under ambiguity yields interesting comparative static
results. In this section, we are going to discuss and interpret the basic properties of rms'
product characteristic choices w.r.t. changes in the model parameters. Similar to Krol
(2012), the following proposition examines c.p. (ceteris paribus) variations in the global
ambiguity attitude . Afterwards, in Proposition 4.2 - Proposition 4.3 of this paragraph,
we want to investigate the inuence of four dierent sources of ambiguity on equilibrium
product dierentiation. Finally, we conclude this section with a discussion of the meaning
of the degree of ambiguity and the support of the uncertainty.
Proposition 4.1 (Variation in rms' ambiguity attitude ). Under Assumption 1,2 and
3, at any SPNE for the Hotelling game under ambiguity, an increase in the degree of
pessimism, , leads to the following eects:
@x1
@
 0 and @x

2
@
 0
Proof. The proof of the proposition is contained in the appendix.
Remark 4.1. Firms' equilibrium dierentiation, x, is nonincreasing in  and strictly
decreasing in  for  > 0. In case of full condence (or without ambiguity),  = 0,
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equilibrium product characteristics are independent of . In this case, rms will not
deviate from their initial product characteristics and equilibrium dierentiation remains
unchanged.
The results of Proposition 4.1 are related to the ndings in Krol (2012) stating that a
higher degree of pessimism leads to less product dierentiation. This nding extends to
our model, with the dierence that the magnitude of the eect is weakened the more
condence rms have in the reference prior q. In case of full condence (or without
ambiguity), rms' attitude towards ambiguity becomes irrelevant for their product dier-
entiation choices. The intuition about this result is the following: For a high degree of
pessimism , each rm puts a larger weight on the maxmin criterion than on the max-
max criterion. Therefore, the worst-case scenario becomes increasingly important. The
worst-case of rm 1 is that the expectation of M is equal to L. As the expectation moves
to the right, and rm 1 considers this expectation as relevant, rm 1 has an incentive to
choose a product characteristic right to its initial characteristics. Similarly, for rm 2, the
worst-case scenario corresponds to left boundary of the support  L. Since rm 2 puts
increasingly more weight to this worst-case, rm 2 has an incentive to move to the left.
All in all, equilibrium dierentiation decreases.
To sum up, contrary to the risk models of MZ (Meagher and Zauner (2004) and Meagher
and Zauner (2005)), ambiguity is not per se a dierentiation force. What matters is
ambiguity attitude of both rms. We call this attitude the degree of global optimism or
pessimism, since we consider a market where both rms exhibit the same ambiguity at-
titude. Hence, attitude towards ambiguity becomes a global characteristic of the market
and could be as well interpreted as 'market sentiment'.
Next, starting with the variance of the reference prior 2, we examine c.p. changes in
dierent sources of ambiguity.
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Proposition 4.2 (Variation in the variance 2). If 0   < 1, then, under Assumptions
1,2 and 3, at any SPNE for the Hotelling game under ambiguity, we have:
@x1
@2
< 0 and
@x2
@2
> 0
Proof. The proof of the proposition is contained in the appendix.
Remark 4.2. Firm 1 (resp. rm 2) chooses a product characteristic left (resp. right) from
its initial characteristic as the variance of M increases. Consequently, equilibrium dier-
entiation, x, increases in 
2. However, for the case of ignorance (complete ambiguity
or complete distrust into the reference prior),  = 1, equilibrium product characteristics
remain unchanged.
This result is in line with the result for the risk case of Meagher and Zauner (2004) where
a higher variance of the underlying distribution for the midpoint of the consumer interval
leads to higher competitive dierentiation. Uncertainty as measured by the variance of
the underlying distribution constitutes a dierentiation force. According to Meagher and
Zauner (2004) the intuition here is that, in the Hotelling game, rms are confronted with
two eects. If a rm chooses a product characteristic more away from that of its competi-
tor, at given prices, it looses market share (demand eect). At the same time, however,
more product dierentiation weakens price competition and leads to higher equilibrium
prices (price eect). Due to quadratic cost functions, the price eect dominates the de-
mand eect. If rms face uncertainty with respect to the distribution of the consumer
interval, the negative eect of loosing market share in some realizations of uncertainty is
not so dramatic as in the certainty case, since there are some other realizations of the
random variable M , where the rm is better located with respect to the location of the
consumer interval than before. Consequently, an increasing variance of the underlying
probability distribution strengthens the dominance of the price eect. Therefore, equi-
librium dierentiation is even more excessive than under certainty. Of course, the same
interpretation applies for the capacity model as long as 0   < 1 with the sole dierence
that the eect of a c.p. increase in 2 is weaker the less condent rms are in the reference
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prior q.
The following proposition examines c.p. variations in the magnitude of quadratic trans-
portation costs.
Proposition 4.3 (Variation in the magnitude of the cost parameter t). If 0 <   1 and
0 <   1, then, under Assumption 1,2 and 3, at any SPNE for the Hotelling game under
ambiguity, we have
@x1
@t
> 0 and
@x2
@t
< 0
Proof. The proof of the proposition is contained in the appendix.
Remark 4.3. In case of full pessimism or full condence rms do not relocate. As a
consequence rms' equilibrium dierentiation will decrease for 0 <   1 and 0 <   1
and remain unchanged for  = 0 or  = 0.
The result of Proposition 4.3 is quite similar to the statement in Krol (2012). Comparing
the Hotelling model with a standard symmetric Bertrand competition, we can observe
the following important dierence. In the standard Bertrand scenario, rms oer homo-
geneous products. The only Nash equilibrium in pure strategies is that rms set prices
equal to marginal costs, implying zero prots for both rms. In a Bertrand world with
heterogeneous products this nding is no longer true. By introducing transportation costs,
the Hotelling framework adds an additional product characteristic to a homogeneous and
symmetric Bertrand competition, thereby rendering products per se more heterogeneous.
It is therefore intuitive that a higher transportation cost weakens competition between
rms. In the Hotelling model there are two countervailing incentives at work that deter-
mine rms' product design choices. One is that rms want to locate in the center of the
Hotelling interval in order to obtain a higher market share. The second is that rms want
to dierentiate their products more, in order to weaken price competition. Now, if price
competition is weakened by a higher transportation cost, it is plausible that rms have
an incentive to reduce product dierentiation in order to obtain a higher market share.
The subsequent proposition explores a c.p. increase in rms' condence level .
21
Proposition 4.4 (Variation in the condence level ). Under Assumption 1,2 and 3, at
any SPNE for the Hotelling game under ambiguity, we have
@x1
@
=
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
< 0 for 0   < 
= 0 for  = 
> 0 for 1   > 
where  2 [0; 1] is a cuto-value with  = (; t; 2; L). Similarly we obtain for x2
@x2
@
=
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
> 0 for 0   < 
= 0 for  = 
< 0 for 1   > 
for the same cuto-value . Taking these results together we obtain for 
@
@
=
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
> 0 for 0   < 
= 0 for  = 
< 0 for 1   > 
Proof. The proof of the proposition is contained in the appendix.
The nding in Proposition 4.4 can be summarized in the following way: If each rm's atti-
tude to ambiguity is suciently optimistic, a lower condence into the reference prior will
increase equilibrium dierentiation. For suciently pessimistic rms a lower condence
into the reference prior will decrease equilibrium dierentiation. Furthermore, there is an
intermediate value of global pessimism , depending on the size of the support L and
the cost parameter t, such that rms' equilibrium dierentiation will remain unchanged
no matter which global condence level rms might assign to the reference probability
distribution for the midpoint M .
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Proposition 4.5 (Variation in the size of the support L). If 0 <   1, then, under
Assumption 1,2 and 3, at any SPNE for the Hotelling game under ambiguity, we have:
@x1
@L
=
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
< 0 for 0   < ^
= 0 for  = ^
> 0 for 1   > ^
where ^ 2 [0; 1] is a cuto-value with ^ = ^(; t; 2). Similarly we obtain for x2
@x2
@L
=
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
> 0 for 0   < ^
= 0 for  = ^
< 0 for 1   > ^
for the same cuto-value ^. Taking these results together we obtain for 
@
@L
=
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
> 0 for 0   < ^
= 0 for  = ^
< 0 for 1   > ^
Proof. The proof of the proposition is contained in the appendix.
Remark 4.4. In case of full condence  = 0 rms do not relocate and competitive
dierentiation remains unchanged.
As we can see, an increasing support for M leads to similar comparative static results
as changes in the condence level . If rms are suciently pessimistic, an increase in
the support will foster decreasing product dierentiation. For an intermediate value of
pessimism rms do not relocate. If rms are suciently optimistic, an increase in L yields
higher equilibrium dierentiation.
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Support and Degree of Ambiguity
The degree of ambiguity (or of rms' condence in the reference prior) plays a central
role in this paper. For this reason, we discuss in the following its meaning in conjunction
with the support of the uncertainty. As proposition 4.5 shows, we can replicate similar
comparative static results as in Krol (2012) by varying the length L of the support of the
midpoint M . Even though similar product dierentiation choices might be generated by
variations in the size of the support L as compared to variations in the condence level
, it indispensable to notice meaningful dierences between the two sources of ambigu-
ity. First of all, variations in L and  might go in similar directions, nevertheless the
magnitude of both eects is dierent. In fact, both eects are interrelated. An increase
in the support has a stronger eect on equilibrium dierentiation if rms' condence in
the reference prior is low. In case of full condence, changes in the support do not af-
fect rms' product design decisions. Secondly, there is a clear dierence between both
sources of uncertainty concerning economic applications. The support of M consists of
all possible midpoint realizations of the consumer interval. Before rms make their de-
sign choices, they anticipate all possible demand realizations and summarize them in the
support interval [ L;L]. An increase in the support interval would mean that rms allow
ex-ante for a larger variety of feasible demand realizations. In our view it is plausible
to argue that in many economic applications the size of the support L is an exogenously
xed variable. What would it actually mean if L was an endogenous variable? It would
mean that rms adjust their views on possible demand realizations in the light of higher
or lower uncertainties by including or excluding certain market demand scenarios. Fur-
thermore, this would imply that rms were ex-ante wrongly informed or had not precise
information about lower and upper bounds of market demand in face of uncertainty. We
do not want to argue that such a scenario is completely implausible, our point is that the
interpretation of support variations is closely tied to rms' wrong perception of possible
demand realizations.
In contrast to the previous interpretation, c.p. variations in the condence level  depart
on the assumption of an exogenously xed support length. Firms know possible upper
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and lower bounds of demand and consider demand uncertainty dened on a xed support.
The reference prior q might reect rms' ex-ante information about the market environ-
ment, e.g. rms might have observable data or can pursue market research to estimate
an underlying probability distribution for market demand. Under the assumption that
rm managers are suciently pessimistic, increasing product dierentiation might have
dierent reasons. One explanation could be that rms become more optimistic, meaning
that due to a change in the market environment rms adjust their ambiguity attitudes
to account for this new situation. On the other hand, it might be the case that rms
obtain more reliable data on market outcomes, therefore increasing their condence in
the data available but do not adjust their attitude towards ambiguity. In such a scenario,
a higher condence into the reference prior weakens the impact of pessimism on product
dierentiation choices.
5 Examples and applications
In this section, we apply our model to a variety of real-life examples. At rst, we discuss
sports betting regarding horse racing and football games. The second application refers
to nancial markets, or to be more precise to the mutual funds market. Furthermore, we
want to mention that similar cases were already discussed in Krol (2012). The purpose
of this section consists of providing the reader with additional insight into the mechanics
of the capacity approach. In particular, we want discuss implications of condence and
pessimism for the interpretation of these examples. One reason why the aforementioned
applications are so apt to be discussed in a Hotelling framework, is given by the fact that
in these markets exists a relatively clear measure of rms' product dierentiation. We
will discuss these measures in the respective subsections. Moreover, consumer preferences
are often uctuating depending on partially unobserved factors, e.g. individual subjective
evaluations. Due to rms' imperfect probabilistic information regarding market demand,
it is plausible that ambiguity is prevalent in those markets.
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5.1 Sports betting
In case of sports betting, the odd of a bookmaker represents his/her product characteristic.
Furthermore, the preferences of a bettor over odds are determined by subjective probabil-
ity estimations of the particular sporting event. Since bookmakers usually want to make
a prot regardless of the result of the sporting event, one can assume that bookmakers are
worst-case-oriented.14 If bookmakers were rather optimistic, they would constantly oer
odds exceeding the expectation of the underlying distribution and eventually run the risk
of bankruptcy.
Horse racing
Smith et al. (2009) examine horse racing data from the UK. The authors provide evidence
for an increased uctuation and divergence of betting exchange prices shortly before the
race. This can be interpreted as a higher degree of ambiguity with respect to bettors'
preferences. At the same time, bookmakers' odds are getting increasingly similar.15 Sup-
posing that horse racing bookmakers exhibit a suciently high degree of pessimism, our
model provides a possible explanation for this observation. Recall that, given that rms
are suciently pessimistic, an increase of ambiguity leads to decreasing product dier-
entiation. The intuition here lies in the fact that pessimistic rms place more weight on
worst-case scenarios. Moreover, the worst-case scenario for the rm whose product char-
acteristic is located on the left hand side corresponds to the realization M = L. Similarly,
the worst-case scenario for the rm on the right hand side corresponds to the realization
M =  L. If rms become more pessimistic, the rm which is left selects a product
characteristic right from its initial characteristic. Hence, the higher rms' pessimism, the
lower their product dierentiation. The strength of this eect increases with increasing
ambiguity, , since rms' condence in their prior belief determines the inuence of the
worst-case scenario on their decision process.
14For more details see Krol (2012).
15As pointed out by Krol (2012), one can verify that the dierences between bookmakers' odds are
decreasing in the corresponding time period by using price comparison websites.
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Football games
Bookmakers' odds on football games exhibit an interesting feature. Typically, whenever
a rather strong team plays against a rather weak team there is little divergence between
bookmakers' odds in favor of a victory of the strong team. In contrast, the odds for a
victory of the weak team are more volatile. In fact, odds become less volatile when the
perceived relative strength of both teams is fairly similar. This observation can be veried
by comparing bookmakers' match day odds. In the examples below, we analyzed the odds
of ten bookmakers.
Bookmaker Odd in favor of Hannover 96 Odd in favor of Bayern Munich
bet365 10 1.25
Sportingbet 11 1.222
Tipico 13 1.25
bwin 9.5 1.22
Interwetten 9 1.27
Bet-at-home 11.5 1.24
Betsson 12.5 1.19
mybet 14 1.22
Betvictor 10.5 1.25
Unibet 12 1.25
Estimated
Variances
2:5667 0:0005
Table 1: Example for the constellation of a strong team versus a weak team
Bookmaker Odd in favor of SC Freiburg Odd in favor of FC Augsburg
bet365 3.1 2.25
Sportingbet 3 2.3
Tipico 3.1 2.35
bwin 2.85 2.3
Interwetten 2.75 2.4
Bet-at-home 3 2.3
Betsson 3.1 2.27
mybet 3.2 2.3
Betvictor 3.125 2.3
Unibet 2.95 2.35
Estimated
Variances
0:0189 0:017
Table 2: Example for the constellation of two balanced teams
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Remark 5.1. Both examples are games from match day 22 on February 23, 2014 of the
German Bundesliga.16 The rst example refers to a game of Bayern Munich, the strong
team, versus Hannover 96 representing the weaker team. Stated odds are to be considered
as multiplication factors of the placed bet in case of winning the bet. For instance, suppose
one puts a bet of e1 in favor of a victory of Hannover 96 at bet365. In case Hannover
96 wins, the bettor receives e10. The second game, SC Freiburg versus FC Augsburg, is
more balanced in terms of relative strength. Estimators used in our examples are
x =
nX
i=1
xi for the mean and s
2 =
1
n  1
nX
i=1
(xi   x)2 for the variance.
If bookmakers agreed on a unique prior over the outcome of the game, this phenomenon
would be inexplicable. Again, the explanation might lie in bookmakers' condence in
their prior beliefs. Assume bookmakers' choose their odds such that a bettor will always
loose a fraction of his money if he bets on both teams, then odds on one team become a
function of the odds of the other team.17 In the situation described above, it is obviously
very likely that the strong team wins. Hence, bookmakers' can be condent that the bulk
of bettors will bet on the very strong team. This leads to two eects. Firstly, in order to
avoid bankruptcy, bookmakers' need to choose odds close to one for a win of the strong
team. Secondly, since bookmakers' face little ambiguity over bettors' preferences, they
can dierentiate their odds for the weak team. This result is in line with our model.
5.2 Mutual funds
Krol (2012) provides the example of the managed mutual funds' market. In this context,
one can interpret a position in the product space as a portfolio's position ranging from
safe investments to risky portfolios. Krol (2012) shows, based on data about the daily
returns of the fteen most popular actively managed US mutual funds, that, after the
nancial crisis 2008, fund managers tend to dierentiate their products less. Krol (2012)
argues that, before the crisis, nancial rms' did not consider the post-crisis range of
16Data was collected online on February 19th, 2014 at 3:30 pm from the respective websites of the
bookmakers.
17See Krol (2012).
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investor behavior as possible.18 For this reason, the crisis forced rms to revise their
beliefs. Furthermore, the author interprets conservative stress test simulations following
the crisis as a signal sent out to the competitors that a rm uses a worst-case-based
approach for decision making. This is exactly the point where we want to add to the
debate. For instance, consider government-imposed stress tests after the crisis. If one
interprets such stress tests as signals, then the strategy of a rm is independent of its
type. Since each type sends the same signal, no new information is revealed to the other
rms. In our view it is debatable whether stress test simulations induced a shift in
fund managers' ambiguity attitude towards a more pessimistic preference approach, or
whether exactly those fund managers knew more clearly that investors would prefer more
secure assets after the crisis. If so, a possible explanation for lower post-crisis product
dierentiation is that rms were less uncertain about investor preferences. In our view,
it is not implausible that fund managers ambiguity attitude remained relatively stable
even though government stress tests were imposed. Furthermore, due to market research
and historical data19 it is likely that fund managers know the whole range of possible
individual investor behaviors.20 However, investor preferences are highly uctuating, since
they depend on investors' subjective evaluations of the fund's performance which itself is
based on numerous observed and unobserved factors as recent stock market developments
or individual future expectations. At the end and shortly after the nancial crisis, rms'
were highly condent in terms of investor preferences, since it was self-evident that post-
crisis, the majority of investors would prefer assets which were rather safe. Again, this
nding is in line with our model.
18In particular, the shift of consumer preferences toward safe investments due to decreasing stock prices
during the crisis.
19Financial rms' can rely on past data of various historical economic crises including stock market
crashes (e.g. the Great Depression in the 1930s), bubbles (e.g. dot-com bubble in 2000) and nancial
crises (e.g. Asian nancial crisis in 1997).
20This would induce that variations in the support of the midpoint of the consumer distribution cannot
account for the observation of decreasing product dierentiation.
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6 Conclusion
We presented an extension of Hotelling's model incorporating ambiguity in the form of
demand location uncertainty as well as uncertainty with respect to the intensity of trans-
portation costs. Ambiguity was introduced by representing rms' beliefs with neo-additive
capacities. We analyzed rms' optimal product characteristic choices and found a unique
SPNE in pure strategies for the Hotelling game under ambiguity.
Our model incorporates a variety of dierent sources of uncertainty. First of all, there is
the variance 2 of the reference probability q. As in the standard risk case of Meagher
and Zauner (2004), a higher variance implies that rms increase product dierentiation.
Thus, if the measure of uncertainty is given by the variance of the underlying reference
probability, it can be considered as dierentiation force.
Secondly, there is the length of the support interval of M . The larger the support of
M , the larger the number of demand realizations that rms consider as possible market
outcomes. Hence, the length of the support interval might be interpreted as an addi-
tional measure of uncertainty. As our results show, the eects on an increasing support
are strongly related to rms' ambiguity attitude  and degree of ambiguity (condence)
. The eect of an increase in uncertainty can go in adverse directions. If rms are
rather pessimistic, a larger support results in lower equilibrium dierentiation, if rms
are rather optimistic, a larger support engenders opposite results. All in all, uncertainty
as measured by the support length can be - depending on parameters - a dierentiation
or agglomeration force.
A third measure of uncertainty is given by the condence parameter  reecting rms un-
certainty on observables. Interpreted in this way, rising uncertainty is tied to lower data
reliability yielding lower condence levels in the reference probability q. Again, similar to
the case of support variations, this can trigger o opposing eects. When rms are pes-
simistic enough, equilibrium dierentiation is going down, when rms a rather optimistic
product dierentiation is going to increase. One can also argue the other way round.
For a given condence level, increasing pessimism yields lower equilibrium dierentiation,
whereas an increase in optimism increases equilibrium dierentiation.
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Finally the last source of uncertainty lies in the transportation cost parameter t. As the
support interval [t; 1] for t increases, rms' equilibrium dierentiation remains the same in
case of full optimism and full condence and decreases in all other cases. Thus, excluding
these boundary cases, we can say that uncertainty with respect to the transportation cost
parameter constitutes an agglomeration force.
As we can see from the preceding line of arguments, one should be very cautious when
it comes to drawing conclusions from real-world applications of Hotelling models under
uncertainty. In our view, it is indispensable to clearly identify the driving factors of
an observed increase or decrease in product dierentiation since the interpretation and
conclusions from observed rm behavior might change in the light of dierent sources of
uncertainty. In particular, it seems worthwhile for policymakers to disentangle the eect
of condence and ambiguity attitude on product dierentiation, since it might really mat-
ter for ocial regulatory procedures whether observed product dierentiation choices are
to be attributed to perceived changes in data-reliability or whether rms feature more or
less optimistic behavioral patterns.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2.1. The support ofM is restricted on the interval [ L;L]   1
2
; 1
2

.
Mean and variance of M exists. For the mean we can perform the following line of
estimates.
Eq[M ] =
Z
R
MdP 
Z
R
LdP = L
Z
R
1dP = L
and
Eq[M ] =
Z
R
MdP 
Z
R
 LdP =  L
Z
R
1dP =  L
Similarly, for the second moment of M we get
E[M2] =
Z
R
M2dP 
Z
R
L2dP = L2 and Eq[M2] =
Z
R
M2dP  0
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and for the variance 2 we have
2M = Eq[M2]  Eq[M ]2  Eq[M ]2  L2 and 2M  0
Proof of Lemma 3.1. According to Assumption 1, at the second stage of the game,
the true midpoint M^ and cost intensity t^ is revealed. Hence, rms know that consumers
are uniformly distributed along [M^   1
2
; M^ + 1
2
] and face a disutility of t^(x   xi)2. Now,
suppose (M^   x) 2 [ 3
2
; 3
2
] where x = x1+x2
2
as before, then inserting rms' demand
functions (compare section 3.1) into rms' prot functions given by (3.2) yields:
1(p1; p2; x1; x2; t^; M^) = p1

 M^ + x1 + x2
2
+
p2   p1
2t^(x1   x2)
+
1
2

2(p1; p2; x1; x2; t^; M^) = p2

M^  

x1 + x2
2
+
p2   p1
2t^(x1   x2)

+
1
2

Note that rms' prot functions are strictly concave in their own price. Consequently,
rms' unique best response function are determined by the rst-order condition of their
prot maximization problems:
@1
@p1
:=  M^ + p2   p1
2t^(x2   x1)
  p1
2t^(x2   x1)
+
x2 + x1
2
+
1
2
!
= 0
@2
@p2
:= M^   p2
2t^(x2   x1)
+
p1   p2
2t^(x2   x1)
  x2 + x1
2
+
1
2
!
= 0
By solving the equation system

@1
@p1
; @2
@p2

= (0; 0), one obtain the price equilibrium in
Lemma 3.1.
Proof of Lemma 3.2. Let (M^   x) =2 [ 3
2
; 3
2
], i.e. either (M^   x) <  3
2
or (M^   x) > 3
2
.
Whenever the condition (M^ x) <  3
2
is satised, rm 1 is closer to the consumer interval
than rm 2 for any consumer x 2 [M^  1
2
; M^ + 1
2
]. In this case, rm 1 can set a price, such
that it obtains the whole consumer demand, even if rm 2 charges a zero price, formally
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from equation (3.1) one obtain the condition:
(x1; x2; p1; p2)
!
= M^ +
1
2
Solving this equation for p1 yields rm 1's best reply:
p1(p2) = 2t^(x1   x2)

x  M^   1
2

+ p2
Given this strategy of rm 1, rm 2's best-reply is given by the set R+. Let us now
consider the case, that rm 2 plays the price p2 = 0. In this case, rm 1's best reply is
given by p1(0) = 2t^(x1   x2)
h
x  M^   1
2
i
. As shown before, p2 = 0 is a best reply to
p1 = 2t^(x1   x2)
h
x  M^   1
2
i
, therefore
(p1; p

2) =

2t^(x1   x2)

x  M^   1
2

; 0

is a price equilibrium. If rm 2 plays a strictly positive price p^2 > 0, then, rm 1's best
reply is given by p1(p^2) = 2(x1 x2)
h
M^ + 1
2
  x1+x2
2
i
+ p^2. If rm 1 sticks to this strategy,
rm 2's has an incentive to lower its price, thereby allowing rm 2 to obtain a positive
share of consumer demand. Therefore an equilibrium with p^2 > 0 does not exist. The
case (M^   x) > 3
2
can be solved along the same line of arguments.
Proof of Lemma 3.3. Lemma 3.4 implies that rms' second-stage prots at (t^; M^)
equal the second piece of (3.3):
1 =
1
18
t^(x2   x1)[ 3 + 2(M^   x)]2
2 =
1
18
t^(x2   x1)[3 + 2(M^   x)]2
Both prot functions are continuously dierentiable with respect to t^ and M^ . Dierenti-
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ation with respect to t^ yields
@1
@t^
=
2
9
(x2   x1)

x1 + x2
2
  M^ + 3
2
2
> 0
@2
@t^
=  2
9
(x1   x2)

x1 + x2
2
  M^   3
2
2
> 0
Dierentiation with respect to M^ yields
@1
@M^
=  4
9
t^(x2   x1)| {z }
<0

x1 + x2
2
  M^ + 3
2

| {z }
>0
< 0
@2
@M^
=
4
9
t^(x1   x2)| {z }
<0

x1 + x2
2
  M^   3
2

| {z }
<0
> 0
Proof of Lemma 3.4. The proof of the lemma follows exactly the same line of argu-
ments as in the proof of Lemma 3.1 in Krol (2012), page 602 with a slight modication
in case 3. There are three dierent cases to be considered.
(1) Case 1 refers to a situation where either rm 1 or rm 2 can monopolize the market
for certain realizations of the midpoint M . If rm 1 can monopolize the market for
certain realizations of M we can conclude that rm 1 will monopolize the market if
M^ =  L, since w.lo.g. rm 1 is the rm left of rm 2. Similarly, we can conclude
that rm 2 can monopolize the market for M^ = L. This is nding is impossible. If
rm 1 monopolizes the market for the realization M^ =  L, we have by Lemma 3.1,
equation (3.2) that x1+x2
2
  3
2
>  L. If rm 2 monopolizes the market, we have by
(3.2) that x1+x2
2
+ 3
2
< L. Thus, we must have that L+ x1+x2
2
> 3
2
and L  x1+x2
2
> 3
2
holds at the same time implying
x1+x2
2
 < L   3
2
. This is a contradiction since L is
assumed to be smaller than 1
2
.
(2) Case 2 describes a scenario where one of the two rms can monopolize the market for
each realization M^ of uncertainty. If rm j is a monopolist, the other rm can deviate
from its original location in order to obtain a positive market share and therefore make
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strictly positive prots. Krol (2012) suggests the location x j =  xj.
(3) Case 3 refers to a situation where w.l.o.g. rm 1 can monopolize the market for
some realizations of uncertainty, in particular the realization M^ =  L and for the
remaining realizations, in particular the realization M^ = L there exists a competitive
equilibrium. Consider now the prot function of rm 2 in case of a competitive
equilibrium21 :
@2
@x2
(x1; x2; L; t) =
t (2L  3 x2 + x1 + 3) (2L  x2   x1 + 3)
18
We want to show that
@2
@x2
(x1; x2; L; t) < 0:
We determine the sign of both brackets. Consider the expression in within the second
bracket rst. We have
2L+ 3  x1   x2 > 0 , 2L+ 3 > x1 + x2 , L+ 3
2
> x
The last condition corresponds to the requirement for a competitive solution in case
that the midpoint M = L realizes. Therefore it must be by assumption positive. The
second bracket is negative. The monopolistic outcome for the midpoint realization
M =  L requires L+x > 3
2
. Solving this inequality for x2 we obtain x2 > 3 2L x1.
With the help of this inequality we can conduct an estimation for the expression in
the rst bracket:
3 + 2L+ x1   3x2 < 8L  6 + 4x1 < 8L  8 < 0
The last inequality follows from the fact that L < 1
2
and x1 < 0. Thus we proved that
@2
@x2
(x1; x2; L; t) < 0:
21We consider the prot function of rm 2, Krol (2012) considers the prot function of rm 1
35
This nding shows that rm 2 has an incentive to move leftwards in order to reduce
both rms' product dierentiation. This nding shows, that a strict competitive so-
lution does not exist under the above stated parameter restrictions. Since we consider
a symmetric scenario, a similar argument holds for a scenario where rm 2 becomes
a monopolist for M^ = L and for M^ =  L there is a competitive solution.
Proof of Lemma 3.5. The rst part of rms' Choquet expected prot is
Eq[i(x1; x2; t;M)] =
LZ
 L
( 1)j 2
9
t (xj   xi)

xi + xj
2
 

M +
3
2
( 1)i
2
f(M)dM
This expectation is of the form
Eq[gi(t)hi(M)]
with real-valued Borel-measurable functions gi and hi for i = 1; 2. We dene
gi(t) = t and hi(M) = ( 1)j 2
9
t (xj   xi)

xi + xj
2
 

M +
3
2
( 1)i
2
:
By Assumption 2, (R7), t and M are uncorrelated. By Lemma 5.20 in Meintrup and
Schaer (2005), page 131, we obtain that also gi(t) and hi(M) are uncorrelated. Thus,
we can conclude
Eq[i (x1; x2; t;M)] = Eq[gi(t)hi(M)] = Eq[gi(t)]Eq[hi(M)] = t Eq[hi(M)]
In the following, we can rely on the results in Meagher and Zauner (2004) page 205, since
Eq[hi(M)] is equal to rm i's expected prot function in the risk case. Thus
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Eq[i(x1; x2; t;M)] = t
LZ
 L
( 1)j 2
9
(xj   xi)

xi + xj
2
 

M +
3
2
( 1)i
2
f(M)dM
=
( 1)j
18
t (xj   xi)f(xi + xj   3( 1)i)2
  4M(xi + xj   3( 1)i) + 4(M + 2M)g
Proof of Proposition 3.1. We derive expected CEU prots at the rst stage of the
game. By doing so, we obtain for rm 1:
CEU[1(x1; x2; ; ; t; 2; L)]
:= 
 
2 (1  ) (x2   x1)
 
L+ x2+x1
2
+ 3
2
2
9
+
2 t (x2   x1)
  L+ x2+x1
2
+ 3
2
2
9
!
+
(1  ) (x2   x1)
 
(x2 + x1 + 3)
2 + 4 2

18
(A.1)
for rm 2 we get:
CEU[2(x1; x2; ; ; t; 2; L)]
:= 
 
2 t (x2   x1)
 
L+ x2+x1
2
  3
2
2
9
+
2 (1  ) (x2   x1)
  L+ x2+x1
2
  3
2
2
9
!
+
(1  ) (x2   x1)
 
(x2 + x1   3)2 + 4 

18
(A.2)
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Taking the derivative of (A.1) with respect to x1 yields
@CEU[1(x1; x2; ; ; t; 2; L)]
@x1
:=
  2 (1  )
 
L+ x2+x1
2
+ 3
2
2
9
+
2 (1  ) (x2   x1)
 
L+ x2+x1
2
+ 3
2

9
+
2  t (x2   x1)
  L+ x2+x1
2
+ 3
2

9
  2  t
  L+ x2+x1
2
+ 3
2
2
9
  (1  )
 
(x2 + x1 + 3)
2 + 4 

18
+
(1  ) (x2   x1) (x2 + x1 + 3)
9
(A.3)
Similarly, we take the derivative of (A.2) with respect to x2
@CEU[2(x1; x2; ; ; t; 2; L)]
@x2
:=
2  t
 
L+ x2+x1
2
  3
2
2
9
+
2  t (x2   x1)
 
L+ x2+x1
2
  3
2

9
+
2 (1  ) (x2   x1)
  L+ x2+x1
2
  3
2

9
+
2 (1  )   L+ x2+x1
2
  3
2
2
9
+
(1  )  (x2 + x1   3)2 + 4 
18
+
(1  ) (x2   x1) (x2 + x1   3)
9
(A.4)
Now, we solve the following system of equations
@CEU[1(x1; x2; ; ; t; 2; L)]
@x2
= 0
@CEU[2(x1; x2; ; ; t; 2; L)]
@x2
= 0
(A.5)
and obtain three solution pairs. The rst solution pair (x1; x

2) is given by:
x1 =
4  ( t+ (1  )) L2 + 12  ((1  )   t) L+ (4  4 ) 2 + 9 (  t    + 1)
8  ( t+ (  1)) L  12 (  t+     1)
x2 =  
4  ( t+ (1  )) L2 + 12  ((1  )   t) L+ (4  4 ) 2 + 9 (  t    + 1)
8  ( t+ (  1)) L  12 (  t+     1)
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The second pair of solutions (x1 ; x

2 ) is given by:
x1 =(2(t  1) + 2) 1
 
22
 
4L2
 
t2 + 6t+ 1
  12L  t2   1+ 9(t  1)2
  2

2L2((5t+ 3) + t  1) + 6L(( t) +  + t+ 1)
  (t  1)(2(   1)2 + 9)

+ 82L2   4L2 + 12L+ 42   42 + 9
! 1
2
+ (2L(t+ 1)  3t+ 3)  2L  3
and
x2 =

2(t  1) + 2
 1( 
22(4L2(t2 + 6t+ 1)  12L(t2   1) + 9(t  1)2)
  2(2L2((5t+ 3) + t  1) + 6L(( t) +  + t+ 1)
  (t  1)(2(   1)2 + 9)) + 82L2   4L2 + 12L+ 42   42 + 9
! 1
2
  (2L(t+ 1)  3t+ 3) + 2L+ 3
)
Finally, the last pair of solutions (x1 ; x

2 ) is given by:
x1 =
  
22
 
4L2
 
t2 + 6t+ 1
  12L  t2   1+ 9(t  1)2  2(2L2((5t+ 3) + t  1)
+ 6L(( t) +  + t+ 1)  (t  1)(2(   1)2 + 9)) + 82L2   4L2 + 12L+ 42
  42 + 9
! 1
2
  (2L(t+ 1)  3t+ 3) + 2L+ 3
!
 (2(t  1) + 2) 1
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and
x2 =  
 
22(4L2(t2 + 6t+ 1)  12L(t2   1) + 9(t  1)2)  2(2L2((5t+ 3) + t  1)
+ 6L(( t) +  + t+ 1)  (t  1)(2(   1)2 + 9)) + 82L2   4L2 + 12L+ 42
  42 + 9
! 1
2
+ (2L(t+ 1)  3t+ 3)  2L  3
!
(2(t  1) + 2) 1
The solution pairs (x1 ; x

2 ) and (x

1 ; x

2 ) do not fulll the global competition condition
according to Lemma 3.4:
L  3
2
< x <  L+ 3
2
We obtain equilibrium prots by inserting the derived equilibrium locations into (A.1)
and (A.2). After several steps of algebra, we get
CEU[i] =
(4  L2 ( t   + 1)  12  L ( t   + 1) + 4 2 (1  ) + 9 (  t    + 1))2
36 (2  L (  t  + 1) + 3 (  t    + 1))
The competitive dierentiation is given by
x = x

2   x1 = 2x2
=
4  ( t+ (1  )) L2 + 12  ((1  )   t) L+ (4  4 ) 2 + 9 (  t    + 1)
4  ( t+ (  1)) L  6 (  t+     1) :
Before starting with the proofs of the comparative static analysis, we want to point
out that for many of the estimations performed in the subsequent ve proofs, we make
use of the following intrinsic parameter restrictions:
 upper and lower support boundaries for M : 0 < L  1
2
 upper and lower bound of the condence parameter: 0    1
 upper and lower bound of ambiguity attitude: 0    1
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 upper and lower bound of the variance of M : 0  2  L2  1
4
 upper and lower bound of the transportation cost parameter: 0 < t  1
Proof of Proposition 4.1. The derivative of x1 with respect to  is given by
( 8  t L3 + 6  t L2   6 t L2   6  L2 + 6L2 + 4  2 t L  4 2 t L)
2 (2  t L+ 2  L  2  L  3  t+ 3    3)2
+
(9  t L+ 9 t L+ 4  2 L  42 L  9  L+ 9L  6  2 t+ 6 2 t+ 6  2   6 2)
2 (2  t L+ 2  L  2  L  3  t+ 3    3)2
The denominator is positive. Therefore, the sign of the derivative is determined by its
numerator or to be more precise by the numerator divided by . We analyze the sign of
this expression in several steps. First of all, we simplify this expression in the following
way
  8tL3 + 6tL2   6tL2   6L2 + 6L2 + 42tL  42tL
+ 9tL+ 9tL+ 42L  42L  9L+ 9L  62t+ 62t+ 62   62
=  8tL3 + 6L2[t  t   + 1] + 42L[t  t+    1] + 9L[t+ t   + 1]
+ 62[ t+ t+    1]
=  8tL2 + (6L2   62)[1  t  t  ] + 42L[t  t+    1] + 9L[t+ t   + 1]
We have 2  L2, thus we can conclude that 6L2 62  0. The expression 1+t t ] is
non-negative. This we can prove in a few small steps. Inserting t = 0 we obtain 1   0.
Inserting t = 1 we obtain the value 0. Taking the derivative with respect to t, we get
   1 which means that the function is a constant for  = 0 and strictly decreasing for
0 <   1. Inserting  = 0 we obtain the value 1 which is non-negative. By applying
the mean value theorem for continuous functions for the case 0 <   1, we obtain that
1 + t  t    0. To sum up, we have that
(6L2   62)[1  t  t  ]  0
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Using this result we can perform the following line of estimations
  8tL2 + (6L2   62)[1  t  t  ] + 42L[t  t+    1] + 9L[t+ t   + 1]
  8tL3 + t[42L+ 9L] + [1 + t  ][9L  42L]
  8t+ 9tL+ [1 + t  ][9L  L]
= tL+ 8tL
> 0 since L > 0; t > 0
This proves that
@x1
@
> 0 and
@x2
@
=  @x1
@
< 0.
Proof of Proposition 4.2. The derivative of x1 with respect to 
2 is given by
@x1
@2
=
4  4 
(8  t+ (8  8) ) L  12  t+ 12    12
The numerator is non-negative since 4   4  for 0    1 and strictly positive for
0   < 1. For the denominator we can conduct the following line of estimations:
(8  t+ (8  8) ) L  12  t+ 12    12
= 8L((t+ 1)  1) + 12((1  t)  1)
 8L((t+ 1  1) + 12((1  t)  1)
 8tL+ 12((1  t)  1)
 4t+ 12   12t  12
  8t+ 12   12
  8t
 0
Thus,
@x1
@2
 0 and @x2
@2
=  @x1
@2
 0. For  = 1 both x1 and x2 are independent of 2.
Therefore
@x2
@2
=
@x1
@2
= 0.
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Proof of Proposition 4.3. We have
@x1
@t
=
  (2L  3) (4  L2   4  L2 + 6  L  3  L  3L+ 2  2   22)
2 (2  t L+ 2  L  2  L  3  t+ 3    3)2
It is obvious that the denominator is positive. Turning to the numerator we can see that
(2L  3) is negative, since L  1
2
. Thus, the remaining part to analyze is given by the
expression
4  L2   4  L2 + 6  L  3  L  3L+ 2  2   2 2 (A.6)
We want to establish that expression (A.6) is smaller or equal than zero.
4  L2   4  L2 + 6  L  3  L  3L+ 2  2   2 2
< 4L2   4L2 + 6L  6L+ 22   22
= 6L  6L
 6L  6L
= 0
Taking all the results of this proof together we obtain
@x1
@t
> 0 and
@x2
@t
=  @x1
@t
< 0:
Proof of Proposition 4.4. The derivative of x1 with respect to  is given by
 6 tL
2   6L2 + 6L2 + 42 t L  9 tL+ 42 L  42 L  9L+ 9L  62 t+ 62   62
2 (2  tL+ 2  L  2  L  3  t+ 3    3)2
It is straightforward to see that the denominator is positive. Thus, turning to the
numerator we obtain
  (6 tL2   6L2 + 6L2 + 42 t L  9 tL
+ 42 L  42 L  9L+ 9L  62 t+ 62   6 2)
=  (6L2(t   + 1) + 42L(  1 + t) + 9L( t   + 1) + 62( t+   1))
=  ((t   + 1)(6L2   62) + (t+   1)(42L  9L))
= 6(t   + 1)(2   L2) + L(t+   1)(9  42)
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As a next step, we evaluate the numerator for  = 1. We obtain
6t(2   L2) + Lt(9  42): (A.7)
In the following we want to establish that expression (A.7) is larger than zero.
6t(2   L2) + Lt(9  42) = t(62   6L2 + 9L  4L2)
> t[62   6L+ 9L  4L2)
= t(3L+ 62   4L2)
 t(3L+ 62   22)
= t(3L  42) > 0
Taking these results together, we obtain that
@x1
@
is positive for  = 1. Similarly, we
evaluate the numerator for  = 0 and obtain
6(2   L2)  L(9  42) (A.8)
In the next step, we want to establish that expression (A.8) is smaller than zero.
6(2   L2)  L(9  42) = 62   6L2   9L+ 4L2
< 6L2   6L2   9L+ 4L3
  9L+ 4L
=  5L
< 0
The numerator of
@x1
@
is a continuous function in . Furthermore we have that
@x1
@
< 0
for  = 0 and
@x1
@
> 0 for  = 1. By using the intermediate value theorem for continuous
real-valued functions, we obtain that there is an  2 (0; 1) such that
@x1
@
=
@x2
@
= 0:
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What remains to be shown is that  is unique. Taking the derivative of the numerator
we obtain
6(t  1)(2   L2) + L(t+ 1)(9  42)
As we can see, the numerator can be strictly increasing or strictly decreasing in , since it
is independent of  and nonzero. We want to show that the numerator of the derivative
is strictly increasing in . We can establish the following estimations
6(t  1)(2   L2) + L(t+ 1)(9  42)
= 6(t2   tL2   2 + L2) + L(9t  4t2 + 9  42)
= 6t2   6tL2   62 + 6L2 + 9tL  4t2L+ 9L  42L
 6t2   6t2   6tL2 + 6tL2   42L  42L+ 9tL+ 9L
>  82L+ 9L
  2L+ 9L
= 7L
> 0
This establishes that the numerator has for every parameter constellation a unique zero
 2 (0; 1), where @x1
@
< 0 for all 0   < , @x1
@
= 0 for  =  and @x

1
@
> 0 for all
1   > . Since x2 =  x1 we obtain the postulated result for x2 without reexamining
the respective derivative.
Proof of Proposition 4.5. The derivative of x1
 with respect to L is given by
( ( 42  t2 L2   42  L2 + 8  L2   4  L2   122  t2 L+ 242  t L
  12  tL  12 tL  122  L+ 12  L+ 12L  12L+ 92  t2
+ 4  2 t  42 t  9  t+ 9 t+ 4  2   4  2   42 + 42   92  + 9  + 9  9 ) )
 (2(2  tL+ 2  L  2  L  3  t+ 3    3)2) 1
As we can see, the denominator is positive. Therefore the sign of the derivative solely
depends on the numerator. Since   0 it is sucient to consider the sign of numerator
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divided by . We denote this expression with (). Inserting  = 0 into expression ()
yields

  4  L2   12L  4  2 + 4 2   9
 [ 12L+ 42   9]
 [ 12L  8]
=  4(3L+ 2)
< 0
This shows that the derivative is strictly negative for  = 0. Similarly, inserting  = 1
into () we obtain
 t
 
4  t L2   12  t L+ 12  L  12L+ 9  t+ 4  2   4 2   9  + 9  (A.9)
We want to show that expression (A.9) is strictly positive. This we show in the following
way
 t
 
4  t L2   12  t L+ 12  L  12L+ 9  t+ 4  2   42   9  + 9 
=  t [4tL2 + 12L[ t+    1] + 9[t   + 1] + 42[   1] ]
=  t [4tL2 + [1 + t  ] [9  12L]| {z }
9 6=3
+42[   1] ]
  t [4tL2 + 3(1 + t  ] + 42[   1] ]
=  t [4tL2 + 3(1  ) + 3t+ 42(   1)]
=  t [4tL2 + 3t+ (1  ) [3  42]| {z }
3 4 1
4
=2
]
=  t [4tL2 + 3t+ 2(1  )]
> 0 (t > 0; L > 0)
Now we know that
@x1
@L
< 0 for  = 0 and
@x1
@L
> 0 for  = 1. The derivative is
continuous. By the intermediate value theorem for continuous functions we obtain that
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there is ^ 2 (0; 1) such that @x1
@L
= 0 for  = ^. What remains to be shown is that ^ is
unique. In this case, we know that x1 is strictly decreasing in L for values of  smaller
that ^, constant for  = ^ and increasing for 1   > ^. Solving expression () for 
we know that we nd at least one zero, the zero ^ in the interval [0; 1]. Since () is a
quadratic function in , we can conclude that it has one more root ^^. This root cannot
be located in the interval [0; 1] as well. This we can show by making use of a proof by
contradiction. Assume w.l.o.g. that ^^ was in the interval [0; 1] as well and that ^ < ^^.
We can distinguish two cases. Case 1 is that the quadratic function has a global maximum
and case 2 is that the quadratic function has a global minimum. Since we can nd both
roots in the interval [0; 1] the global maximum or alternatively the global minimum are
also located in this interval. Assume now that we have a quadratic function with a global
maximum. In this case we have that () is smaller zero for  < ^, equal to zero for
 2 f^; ^^g and smaller zero for  2 ( ^^; 1]. The last statement contradicts that () is
larger zero for  = 1 what we already showed above. For a global minimum a similar line
of arguments holds. Since both roots are located in the interval [0; 1], we can deduce that
the minimum is located in this interval as well. In this case we have that () is larger
than zero for  < ^, equal to zero for  2 f^; ^^g and again larger zero for  2 ( ^^; 1].
The rst statement contradicts that () is smaller zero for  = 0. To sum up, we have
only one root in [0; 1].
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